Steadman v. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1980
Steadman v. Security and Exchange Commission
(SEC)
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steadman v. Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 75. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell
Jr. Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Virginia.
April 25, 1980 Conference 






Cert. to CAS (Wisdom, Godbold, 
Tjoflat) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Whether, in SEC disciplinary proceedings, 
violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws 
must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by 
a preponderance of the evidence. 
FACTS: In June 1971, the SEC instituted an administrative 
:::::::::;-
proceeding against petitioner and certain of his wholly owned 
( 
federal securities laws resulting from pet1t1oner·s manageme nc 
of several registered mutual funds. After an evidentiary 
hearing, the SEC found that petition~r had violated various 
anti-fraud and reporting provisions of the securities laws by, 
among other things, intentionally concealing his practice of 
obtaining loans for himself and certain of his wholly owned 
companies from banks in which he caused the mutual funds that 
he managed to maintain large cash deposits in 
non-interest-bearing checking accounts. In making the 
findings, the SEC used the preponderance of the evidence 
standard. The sanctions imposed were that petitioner should be 
barred indefinitely from association with investment advisers 
or registered investment companies and also should be suspended 
for one year from association with brokers or dealers in 
securities. 
HOLDING BELOW: . In his appeal to CAS, petitioner contended, 
inter alia, that the SEC should have u~ilized the clear and 
convincing evidence standard in evaluating the record. CAS --------~ ---- -rejected this contention. The court refused to follow Collins 
Securities Corp. v. SEC, S62 F.2d 820 (CADC 1977), in which the 
CADC had required the SEC to employ a clear and convincing 
evidence standard in administrative proceedings brought against 
broker-dealers under the securities laws that involved 
allegations of fraud and substantial sanctions. 
CAS utilized an approach similar to that employed in 
1 
/ -
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); the court balanced the 
risk that petitioner might be excluded from the investment 
advisory bu siness du e to an erroneous finding of fact against 
the potential injury to the public from an erroneous finding. 
( 
( 
Concluding that petitioner's 1nterest. a1a not: uuLwt::J.':jll l..llal.. v.L 
the public, CAS held that it was appropriate for both parties 
here to bear the risk of error equal~y by use of a 
preponderance of the evidence standard. 
The court was concerned with the severity of the sanctions 
imposed, however, and accordingly ruled that permanent 
exclusion from practicing a profession would be an 
inappropriate remedy "without justification in fact," unless 
the SEC specifically articulated compelling reasons for such a 
sanction. Finding the SEC's reasoning insufficiently explicit 
for the court to assess the reasonableness of the remedies 
ordered, CAS rema~ded to the ~c. 
CONTENTIONS: Petitioner here se~ks cert. only on the 
question of the proper standard of proof to be ap~lied. He 
reasserts his argument that the proper standard is the clear 
and convincing evidence standard, both because fraud is alleged 
and the sanctions are severe. Petitioner asserts that the 
conflict with Collins, the holding of which was reaffirmed by 
CADC in Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676 (CADC 1979), is an 
irreconcilable one. Petitioner's argues that the conflict is 
exacerbated by the fact that under lS u.s.c. §§ 77i, 78y, SEC 
( respondents have the choice of their home circuit in addition 
I to the CADC for review of SEC disciplinary orders. 
The SG does not oppose cert., in fact · arguing that it 
should be granted. Although the SG agrees with CAS's 
conclusion on the appropriate standard of proof in 
administrative proceedings, the conflict is direct and is 
important because numerous SEC proceedings each year involve 
alleged violations of anti-fraud provisions of the securities 
laws. The SG notes the fact that CAS remanded the case to the 
SEC, but argues that the question presented here is nonetheless 
ripe for review at this time. The SEC's further explanation of 
its choice of remedy will not aid the Court in resolving the 
legal issue of the applicable standard of proof. 
DISCUSSION: The Court co~ld decide to await the outcome of 
the case following remand, but it does not appear that the 
instant issue will change. CAS has affirmed the findings of 
violations reached under the disputed standard and has remanded 
only as to the remedy. The conflict does appear important, 
especially in light of the forum shopping potential inherent in 
the choice of home circuit versus CADC provision. 
Arguably, the cases may be distinguishable on the basis of 
scienter. CAS noted that in the instant case the SEC relied 
"to a significant degree" on violations of section 17(a) (2) & 
(3) of the Securities Act and section 206(2) of the Investment 
Advisors Act. These, stated CAS, involve fraud only in a broad 
"remedial" sense and require no showing of intent to injure. 
Thus the facts necessary to establish a violation of these 
sections are capable of proof by ordinary direct or 
circumstantial evidence. But it seems fairly clear that CADC 
did not premise its Collins rule on the need to prove scienter; 
.. 
the Collins court expressly did not decide whether scienter was 
required in injunction actions brought by the SEC [Cf. No. 
79-66, Aaro~~~]. See S62 F.2d at 826-827. 
There is a response. 
4/lS/80 Wahoske op. in petn 
Argued .................. . , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
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Motion of Petitioner to 
Dispense with Printing the 
Appendix 
CA 5 
Petr, with the consent of the SEC, asks to dispense with 
the appendix since the case involves a single question of law. 
The appendix to the cert petn provides all necessary information. 
Petr did not consult the SG. 
The request appear~ appropriate. 
5/21/80 Marsel 
\ 
Argued ..... . ........ . .... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . No. 79-126 




Motion to dispense with printing the appendix. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: December 2, 1980 
RE: No. 79-1266, Steadman v. SEC 
Question Presented 
The question is whether the "clear and convincing" or 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard applies in SEC 
disciplinary proceedings resulting from alleged violations of 
the antifraud provi~ions of the securities laws. 
Discussion 
This is not an easy . . case to vote on. But the 
arguments are relatively easy to describe. 
A. Petr's arguments 
The SEC has entered an order that would permanently 
bar petr from practicing the profession of "investment 
advisor." The SEC's order also forces immediate divestiture of 
..., 
his investment in his company, at great financial loss. The 
SEC should not be able to do this without satisfying a standard 
of proof more rigorous than mere "preponderance of the 
evidence." 
Sound policy considerations as well as standard 
principles of statutory construction compel this conclusion. 
The sanction the SFC seeks to impose is one that precludes petr 
from pursuing his chosen career. For him, the consequences of 
the SEC's proposed action are of the utmost gravity. To be 
sure, the SEC--if jt is correct that petr's conduct merits such 
sanction--has an i nterest in protecting the public from harm. 
But there is a "po~sibility of mistaken factfinding inherent in 
all litigation." Speiser v. Randall, 357 u.s. at 526. The 
risk of harm to the state from an incorrect decision pales by 
comparison to the risk of harm to the individual. Petr "should 
not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error 
when the possible injury to [petr] is s igni f ican tly greater 
than any possible harm to the state." Addington v. Texas, 441 
u.s. at 427. This is particularly true where, as here, the 
sanctions sought by the SEC are personally stigmatizing as well 
as professionally fatal. Id. at .424. 
The foregoing principles, it is true, were stated 
primarily in the due process context. [It is unclear whether 
petr seriously contends that the constitution requires the 
greater proof burden.] This case requires the Court to divine 
c:::=:.--
the intent of Congress in granting the SEC disciplinary powers 
under the Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers 
Act. The fundamental principle of examining the risk of error 
is applicable here. Historically, common law fraud actions, 
and other quasi-criminal proceedings required the plaintiff to ------------------------ --
prove his case "by clear and convincing evidence." See Brief 
- ~----------------------
for petr at 15-20 and cases cited therein. That common law 
rule developed because of the danger of stigma to one found to 
have behaved fraudulently. Sanctions by the SEC pursuant to 
the various investment acts are very much akin to common law 
fraud actions in light of the stigma associated with a finding 
of guilt. Thus, in construing the investment acts--which 
concededly do not specify a burden of proof--this Court should 
deem Congress to have intended the burden of proof applicable 
to analogous actions at common law. 
Similarly, most states in the context of disbarring 
attorneys require clear and convincing evidence of wrongdoing. 
Nothing in the Administrative Procedure Act is to the 
contrary. That Act does specify that "reliable, probative and 
substantial evidence" shall support agency orders. But that 
has nothing to do with the burden of proof; rather, it 
pertains "to the quality and nature of the evidence upon which 
an order must be based." , Woodby v. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service, 385 u.s. 276, 283 (1966). 
No serious harm would come to the SEC if the larger 
proof burden were required. The SEC has been applying the 
"clear and convincing" evidence test since the CADC's decision 
in a case identical to this one. Since that time, the SEC has 
prevailed in all 20 of the disciplinary cases that it has 
brought. 
The availability of judicial review of SEC orders is 
insufficient to ensur~ justice to investment advisors that have 
been subject to SEC discipline. The standard for judicial 
review is "substantial evidence." Few, if any, borderline 
cases will be reversed because the court found no substantial 
evidence to support ~EC sanctions. 
B. Resp's arguments 
The SEC contends that a 





standard differs from preponderance, there will be instances in 
which persons who hav~ acted illegally will not be subject to 
the discipline that is due them. In sum, any burden of proof 
other than "prepondera11ce" increases the likelihood of error. 
In this case, there is no reason to endorse a principle that 
invites more errors. The SEC has a significant interest in 
meting out discipline to those who have violated the law. 
The traditional standard of proof in civil litigation 
is preponderance of the evidence. Congress did not demonstrate 
any inclination to c~ange that burden when it enacted the 
securities acts. Petr's analogy to common law fraud is 
unavailing. This is a statutory proceeding designed to protect 
investors, not a civi l fraud case. In any event, the better 
reasoned common law fraud cases also apply a preponderance 
standard. Petr's analogy to attorney disbarment also is not 
apt. There is no licensing mechanism for investment advisors 
akin to bar requiremel"''ts for attorneys. Because there is no 
pre-screening, this Court should not make it unduly difficult 
to remove investment advisers who act illegally. 
Traditionally, the Court requires the clear and 
convincing standard only in cases such as deportation or 
confinement in a mental institution. In those cases, 
constitutional concerns are gravely implicated. Here, by 
contrast, the object of the proceeding is simply to impose a 
civil sanction on a businessman. 
The APA's requirement that an agency rely only on 
evidence that is "reliable, probative and substantial" requires 
the application of the preponderance standard. The legislative 
history of the APA mandates that, "where there is evidence pro 
and con, the agency must weigh it and decide in accordance with 
the preponderance." 
Finally, the Court should pay substantial deference 




in Vermont Yankee, "agencies are free 
procedural rights in the exercise 




impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them." In 
this case, the SEC imposed its , sanctions after an extensive 
hearing. Petr was given plenty of procedural protections. It 
is unnecessary and unwarranted to give him another in the form 
of a substantial proof burden. 
C. Analysis & Criticism ..-/ ~...-'"L-
This case, I think, could go either way~ Obviously, 
the SEC's sanctions cause great harm to the individual who is 
subject to them. As a constitutional rna tter, however, this 
Court generally does not impose the "clear and convincing" 
standard except in cases like Addington, which involved 
commi ttment to a mental hospital. Thus, to the extent that 
petr claims that due process requires the proof burden he 
seeks, I disagree. 
As a matter of statutory construction, however, I 
lean to hold 
~~analogous to 
~ C Court should 
~ 
~ 
for petr. Discipline of this sort is roughly 
an action seeking a remedy for fraud. Perhaps the 
deem Congress to have intended that the common law 
proof burden in those cases--y ear and convincing evidence"--
be used in this case. [The APA provision cuts against this 
. ~~~Jl. view, but the 
~, construes the Investment Company and Investment Advisors Acts 
APA provision is inapplicable if the Court 
to require a standard different from the normal standard 
imposed by the APA.] 
It would be easy to write this case either way. 
P.W.C. 12/2/80 
... : .... 
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~ , ~~~e:h~ 
w .. N-./'f . ~ ~ ~ ~~ 
~~~·~? 
 ~~ 
1-t-L_ ~~ ~~~~ 
~~. 
7h..e_ /l-f/A-c7~CZ ~~ 
~~ 
~(~) 
~ ~ ' 1 c~ J t11f /f~ /J- 4--t--
C#<-~ · ~6(n.A?~~ 
~~(~d-f'~) 
W~ v !Jl./S 3? _s-bt._:s. 2,76 ·~ 
~~~~ 
~~~4-~ ~J 
~ . . >'o~~. 
' __ __, 
~~-~~~~-~ 
l1l-{_ ~{f 7 CC)j a.~~  -t---
~~· ~ 








,LA- /J.<~ --1! IIII<L."-'-•t a-( 7(9) - ~ 
~~~D-ft-.~41~ 
79-1266 Steadm~n v. S.E.C.~ 7- ~ Conf. 12/5/80 
The Chief Justice  
~~ A;J6~/)I/-
~~ A-la ... A • ...A 
Mr. 
Mr. Justice Stewart JGr.,~rs~ , 
··~ ;~;:;:;···~~~~ 
~ ~r-4- ,_~~~ ~ ~- :; } ~ 
~ 4..f;A .. JG...4.(_ ~  ~;.~c../ 
~ /r~ ~A.~~....,,~ 
.-
Mr. 
Mr. Justice Marshall 
~· - .. - =-
I ' 
Mr. 
A A~ ~ L -w.-4 I t.C.t~.ia,_...-.=V ~ ~ .. .v....,- --/ . r·~
A'AI'A ~~~. ~ ~ 
4 .. .--c 8~-ti~ ~~ ~ 
~ ~ /2-J-.....d_ ..-..c.c.tj C( ~,._,/..,..,....(,_ ~ 
$ ~"""-~ 4• .. u ~~,J 
~~-44m~t·st · ~~~ 
4.-~~ 
Mr. Justice Stevens ~ 
.....,_ .... ~-- ..... 
~ ~ ,flr!J./t ~~~ 
l=o A.~~ a.,..&-u.-:.z. 
t, ' 
. ' . 
" Tl~tl Chi".:f' J ·' I ,, YiYlrr r · te 
Mr <3 . ~T'shall 
r. Judt ue Blal: k:mun 
Mr. Justloa Powell 
~r. JuHtice Rohnquiat 
Mr Just1oo Stevena 
··r m: .\r. Justice Brennan 
. FEB 3 1981 
.i rcul?..ted . 
let DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 79-1266 r ,._( 
Chll.rles W. Steadman, Petitioner,lOn Writ for Certiorari to~/::;:;.1 
v. the United States Court(J 
Securities and Exchange of Appeals for the Fifth . ~) 
Commission. Circuit. ~ ) 
[February -, 1981] -=z- / I 'Z-
JusTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In administrative proceedings, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission applies a preponderance of the evidence stand-
ard of proof in determining whether the antifraud provisions 
of the federal securities laws have been violated. The ques-
tion presented is whether such violations must be proved by 
clear and convincing evidence rather than by a preponderance 
of the evidence. 
I 
In June 1971, the Commission initiated a disciplinary pro-
ceeding against petitioner and certain of his wholly-owned 
companies. The proceeding against petitioner was brought 
pursuant to § 9 (b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 1 
and § 203 (f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.2 The 
1 Section 9 (b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. 
§ SOa-9 (b), empowers the Commi8Sion, in specified circumstances, "after 
notice and oplJortunity for hearing ... [to] prohibit, conditionally or 
unconditionally, either permanently or for such period of time as it in its 
discretion shall deem appropriate in the public interest, any person from 
serving or acting as an employee, officer, direetor, member of an advisory 
board, investment adviser or depositor of, or principal underwriter for, a 
registered investment company or affiliated per8on of such investment 
adviser, depositor, or principal underwriter .... " 
2 Section 203 (f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. 
~SOb-& (f), empowers the Commission, in specified circumstances, after 
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Commission alleged that petitioner had violated numeroue 
provisions of the federal securities laws in his management 
of several mutual funds registered under the Investment Com-
pany Act. 
After a lengthy evidentiary hearing before an administra-
tive law judge and review by the Commission in which the 
preponderance of the evidence standard was employed, 3 the 
notice and opportunity for hearing "on the record" to "censure or place 
limitations on the activities of any person associated or seeking to be-
come associated with an investment adviser, or suspend for a period not 
exceeding twelve months or bar any such person from being a&;ociated 
with an investment adviser .... " 
8 Disciplinary proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion are governed by the Commission's Rules of Practice, - 17 C. F . R. 
§ 201.1 et seq, which enlarge, in certain re:spects, protections afforded by 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 551 et seq. Cf. 
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,524 (1978) (as to 5 U.S. C. §'553, "[a]genc:ies 
are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their · dis-
cretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the 
agencies have not cbosen to grant them"). A respondent in a disciplinary 
proceeding is entitled to receive timely notice of the charges against him 
and the questions of fact and law to be determined. 17 C. F. R. § 201.6 
(a). He may retain counsel to represent him in connection with the pro-
ceeding, id., § 201.2 (b), file an answer to the charges agaim;t him and 
move for a more definite Btatement of those charges, id, §§ 201.7 (a) and 
(d), and have a trial-type 11earing presided over by an impartial adminis-
trative law judge, other duly-appointed officer, or a Commission member, 
id., §§ 201.11 (b)-(c). The respondent may present oral or documentary 
evidence, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and object to the admission or 
exclusion of evidence. /d., § 201.14 (a). A respondent may compel pro-
duction of evidence by subpoena, id., § 201.14 (b), and may obtain witness 
statements in the possession of the Commission's staff for cross-examina-
tion purposes, id., § 201.11.1. AL the conclusion of the hearing, the re-
&pondent has the right to submit briefs and proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. I d., § 201.16 (d). The initial decision of the admin-
i:strative law judge must include finding::; of fact and conclusions of law, 
with supporting rea8ons, on all material i::;sue,; of fact , law, or discretion 
presented on the record. I d., § 201.16 (a). A respondent may seek review 
by .the Commission, which may affirm, reverse, or modify the initial a.eci-
19-1266-0PINION 
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Commission held that between December of 1965 and June 
of 1972, petitioner had violated antifraud/ reporting,5 conflict 
of interest,6 and proxy 7 provisions of the federal securities 
laws. Accordingly, it entered an order permanently barring 
petitioner from associating with any investment adviser or 
affiliating with any registered investment company, and sus,. 
pending him for 1 year from associating with any broke!' 
or dealer in securities.8 
Petitioner sought review of the Commission's order in the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit on a 
number of grounds, only one of which is relevant for our 
purposes. Petitioner challenged the Commission's use of the 
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in determin .. 
ing whether he had violated antifraud provisions of the se~ 
curities laws. He contended that, because of the potentially 
severe sanctions that the Commission was empowered to im-
pose and because of the circumstantial and inferential nature 
sion based on its independent review of the record. I d., §§ 201.17 (g) (2); 
201.21. 
4 Section 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77q (a); 
§ 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19:~4, i5 U. S. C. § 78j (b), 
and Rule lOb-5 thereunder, 17 C. F. R. § 240.10h-5; §§ 206 (1)-(2) of 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S C.§§ 80b-6 (1)-(2). 
3 Section 17 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 78q (a) and Rule 17a-5 thereunder, 17 C. F. R. § 240.17a-5; §§ 30 (a) 
and 34 (b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S. C. §§ SOa-
29 (a) and SOa-33 (b). 
0 Sections 15 (a) (1), 17 (a) and 17 (e) of the Invei:>tment Company Act 
of 1940, 15 U. S. C. §§ SOa-15 (a) (1), 80a-17 (a) and 80a-17 (e). 
7 Section 20 (a) of the InvestmE:'nt Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. 
§SOa-20 (a). 
8 Petitioner was allowed 90 day::s in which to sell his stock in StPadman 
~ecurities Corporation. Compliance with the Commi~ion's order has 
been stayed pending completion of judicial review. 
Because the Commis::sion impo:sed severe sanction<> on petitioner, the 
Court of Appeals remanded to the Commi<>Sion "to articulate carefully 
the grounds for its dPrision, including an explanation of why les:ser sarrc-
tions 'will not suffice." 603 F. 2d 1126, 1143 (CA5 1979). 
' . 
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of the evidence that might be used to prove intent to defraud, 
the Commission was required to weigh the evidence against 
a clear and convincing standard of proof. The Court of Ap-
peals rejected petitioner's argument, holding that in a disci-
plinary proceeding before the Commission violations of the 
antifraud provisions of the securities laws may be established 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 603 F. 2d 1126, 1143 
(CAS 1979). Seen. 8, supra. Because this was contrary to 
the position taken by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia, see Whitney v. Securities and Ex-
change Commission, 196 U. S. App. D. C. 12, 604 F. 2d 676 
(1979); Collins Securities Corp. v. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 183 U.S. App. D. C. 301, 562 F. 2d 820 (1977), 
we granted certiorari to resolve the conflict. 446 U. S. 917 
(1980). We affirm. 
II 
Where Congress has not prescribed the degree of proof 
which must be adduced by the proponent of a rule or order 
to carry its burden of persuasion in an administrative pro-
ceeding, this Court has felt at 1iberty to prescribe the stand-
ard, for "[i] t is the kind of question which has traditionally 
been left to the judiciary to resolve." Woodby v. Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service, 385 U. S. 276, 284 (1966). 
However, where Congress has spoken, we have deferred to 
"the traditional powers of Congress to prescribe rules of evi-
dence and standards of proof in the federal courts" 9 absent 
countervailing constitutional constraints. Vance v. Terrazas, 
444 U. S. 252, 265 ( 1980) . For Commission disciplinary pro-
ceedings initiated pursuant to 15 U. S. C. § 80a-9 (b) and 
§ 80b-3 (f), we conclude that Congress has spoken, and has 
9 There is no reason to accord le:;s deference to congressionally-prescribed 
standards of proof and rules of evidence in administrative proceeding::; than 
in federal courts. See Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
385 U. S. 276, 284 (1966) (ascertaining first that Congress had not legis-
lated a %tandard of proof for administrative cleport~~tion proceedings be-
fore determining appropriate stauchtd). 
'19-1266-0PINION 
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sa.id that the preponderance of the evidence standard should 
be applied.10 
The securities laws provide for judicial review of Commis-
sion disciplinary proceedings in the federal courts of appeals 11 
and specify the scope of such review.12 Because they do 
not indicate which standard of proof governs Commission ad-
judications, however, we turn to § 5 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. § 554, which "applies ... in 
every case of adjudication required by statute to be deter-
mined on the record after opportunity tor an agency hearing," 
except in instances not relevant here. 5 U. S. C. § 554.18 
10 Because the task of determining the appropriate ::;tamlard of proof 
in the instant case is one of di:scerning Congre8l:>ional intent, many of peti-
tioner's arguments are simply inapposite. He contend::;, for example, that 
as a matter of policy, the potentially :severe consequence:; to a respondent 
in a Commis::;ion proceeding involving allega.tious of fraud demand that his 
burden of risk of erroneous factfinding should be reduced by requiring the 
Commission to prove violations of the antifraud provisions of the securi-
ties laws by clear and convincing evidence. Thi::; argument overlooks, 
however, Congress' "traditional powers . . . to prescribe ::;ta.ndards of 
proof. ... " Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. '25'2, 20:5 (1980) . It is not for 
thi::; Court to determine the wisdom of Congre:ss> pre::;cription. 
11 15 U. S .C. §§ '77i, 78y, 80a-42 and 80b-13 provide for judicial re-
view of Commission orders in the court::; ol appeals. 
12 Commission findings of fact are conclusive for a reviewing court "ii 
supported by substantial evidence." 15 U. S. C. §§ 78y, 80a-42 and 
80b-13; cf. id., § 77i (Commi::;sion findings ton elusive "if ::;upported by 
evidence.") . 
18 This disciplinary proceeding, brought by the Commi:ssion pursuant to 
15 U. S. C. § 80a-9 (b) and § 80b-3 (f), is clearly a. "case of adjudica-
tion" within 5 U. S. C. § 554. See International Telephone & Telegmph 
Corp . v. Intern~tional Brotherhood of Electrical Workers , 419 U. S. 428, 
445 (1975) . Both §80a-9 (b) and §80b-3 (f) also explicitly require an 
"opportunity for an agency hearing." Morevver, the di::;ciplinary pro-
ceeding muRt be conducted "on the record." The phrase "on the record" 
appears in § 80b-3 (f), and while il does not appear in § 80a.-9 (b), n. 1, 
supm, the absence of the specific phrase from § 80a-9 (b) doe::> not make 
the instant proceeding not subject to § 554. See United States v. Florida 
East Coast R . Co ., 410 U. S. 224, 238 (1978); United States v. Allegheny-
Lucllum Steel Corp., 406 U. S. 742, 757 (1972); Seacoast Anti-PolMion 
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~ection 5 (c)(2), 5 U.S. C.§ 554 (c)(2), makes the provisions 
of § 7, 5 U. S. C. § 556, applicable to adjudicatory proceed-
ings.14 The answer to the question presented in this case 
turns therefore on the proper construction of § 7.15 
The search for Congressional intent begins with the lan-
~uage of the statute. Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 
- U. S. -, - (1981); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 
U. S. 330, 337 (1979); 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 
U. S. 593, 596 (1951). Section 7 (c), 5 U. S. C. § 556 (d), 
!tates in pertinent part: 
"Except as otherwise provided by statute, the propo-
nent of a rule or order has the burden of proof. Any oral 
or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency 
as a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of 
League v. Castle, 572 F . 2d 872, 876 (CAl), cert. denied, 439 U. S. 824 
(1978). Rather, the "on the record" requirement for § 80a-9 (b) is satis-
Aed by the substantive content of the adjudication. Title 15 U. S. C. 
fSOa-42 provide;; for judicial review of Commis;;ion order;; issued pur-
Amant to § 80a-9 (b). Sub;;tantial evidence review by the courts of ap-
peals requires a hea.ring on the record . See Citizens to Preserve Ove7'ton 
Park, Inc. Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U. S. 402, 415 ( 1971); Seacoast Anti-Pollu-
tian League v. Castle, supra, 572 F. 2d, at 877 . Otherwi;;e effective re-
view by the courts of appeals would be fru~trated. Ibid. In addition, 
the substantive violations to be proved punmant to §§ 80a-9 (b) ( 1 )-(3) 
are virtually identical to the sub~t<tntive viola.tion;; stated in §§ 80b-3 (e) 
(1), (4) and (5) which are incorporated by reference into § 80b-3 (f). 
The only substantive difference between § 80b-3 (f) and § 80a-9 (b) is 
that the former permits the Conunis;;ion to impo;;e sanctions on persons 
affiliated with an investment advi~er and the latter, on persons affiliated 
with an inve::;tment company. In both statut~, the Commis;;ion is re-
quired to prove violations of the securities law provisions enumerated, 
precisely the type of proceeding for which the APA's adjudicatory proce-
dures were intended. See generally 410 U. S., a.t 246. 
H Section 5 (c)(2), 5 U. S. C.§ 544 (c)(2), provides that "[t]he agency 
shall give all interested parties opportunity for . .. hearing and decision 
on notice and in accordance with section::; 556 and 557 of thit:~ title:" 
15 Petitioner make::; no claim that the federal con::;titution requires appli-
cation of a clear und convincing evidence standard. See Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 10. 
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irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence. A 
sanction may not be imposed or rule or order issued ex-
cept on consideration of the whole record or those parts 
thereof cited by a party and supported by and in accord-
ance with the reliable, probative, and substantial evi-
dence." (Emphasis added.) 
The language of the statute itself implies the enactment of 
a standard of proof. 
By allowing sanctions to be imposed only when they are 
11in accordance with ... substantial evidence," Congress im-
plied that a sanction must rest on a minbnum quantity of 
evidence. The word "substantial" denotes quantity.16 The 
phrase "in accordance with ... substantial evidence'' thus re-
quires that a decision be based on a certain quantity of evi-
dence. Petitioner's contention that the phrase "reliable, pro-
bative and substantial evidence" sets merely a standard of 
quality of evidence is, therefore, unpersuasive.17 
The phrase "in accordance with" lends further support to 
a construction of § 7 (c) as establishing a standard of proof. 
Unlike § 10 (e), the AP A's explicit "Scope of review" provi-
sion that declares that agency action shall be held unlawful 
jf "unsupported by substantial evidence," 10 § 7 (c) provides 
10 Webster'::; Third New International Dictionary (1976) defines ";;;ub-
stantial" to mean "considerable in amount." 
17 Section 7 (c), of coun;e, also :;ets minimum quality of evidence stand-
ards. For exumple, the provi~ion directing agency exclusion of "irrelevant, 
immaterial, or unduly repetitiou:s evidence," und the further requirement 
that an agency sanction rest on "reliable" and "probative" evidence man-
date that agency decisionmaking be premised on evidence of a certain 
level of quality. Tlltl~, while the words "reliable" and "probative" may 
imply quality of evidenee eoncern:s, the word ":subb1:antiul" implies quantity 
of evidt>nce. · 
18 Section 10 (e) of the APA, 5 U. S. C § 706, i:s entitled "Scope of re-
view" and provide:>, in pertinent part, that "[t]he reviewing court 
shall ... hold unlawful and set, aside agency action, findings, and conclu-
sions found to be ... unsupported by substantial evidence in lt case sub-
ject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwi:se reviewed on the rec-
ord ~f .an agency hearing provided by ~atute." !d., § 706 (2) (E). 
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that an agency may issue an order only if that order is ''sup~ 
ported by and in accordance with ... substantial evidence'' 
(emphasis added). The additional words "in accordance 
with" 19 suggest that the adjudicating agency must weigh the 
evidence and decide, based on the weight of the evidence, 
whether a disciplinary order should be issued. The language 
of§ 7 (c), therefore, requires that the agency decision must be 
Hin accordance with" the weight of the evidence, not simply 
supported by enough evidence" 'to justify, if the trial were to 
a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought 
to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.' " Consolo v. 
Federal Maritime Commission, 383 U. S. 607, 620 (1966), 
quoting National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Enam-
eling & Stamping Co., 306 U. S. 292, 300 ( 1939). Obviously, 
weighing evidence has relevance only if the evidence on each 
side is to be measured against a standard of proof which allo-
cates the risk of error. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 
418, 423 (1979). Section 10 (e), by contrast, does not permit 
the reviewing court to weigh the evidence, but only to deter-
mine that there is in the record 11 'such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a con-
clusion,'" Consolo v. Federal Maritime Commission, supra, 
383 U.S., at 620, quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. National 
Labor Relations Board, 305 U. S. 197. 229 (1938). It is not 
surprising, therefore, in view of the entirely different purposes 
of § 7 (c) and § 10 (e), that Congress intended the words 
"substantial evidence" to have different meanings in context. 
Thus, petitioner's argument that § 7 (c) merely establishes 
19 Section IO(e) expressly refers to § 7. Addition of the words "in a.c-
cordance with" could not have been inadvertent. See n. 18, supra. This is 
especially true in light of the House Report's discu::;.siou of the rela.tionship 
Letween § 7 (c) and § 10 (e) : " 'Sub,;tantial evidence' [in § 10 (e)] means 
evidence which on the whole record is clearly substantial, plainly sufficient 
to sup]Jort a findlllg or conclusion under the requirements of section 7 (c) , 
and ma.terial to the i~:sues." H . R. Ikp. No. 1980, 79th Cong., ~d Ses-s.,. 
45 (194f:i).. 
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~he scope of judicial review of agency orders is unavailing. 20 
While the language of§ 7 (c) suggests, therefore, that Con .. 
gress intended the statute to establish a standard of proof, the 
language of the statute is somewhat opaque concerning the 
precise stan<.Iard of proof to be used. The legislative history, 
however, clearly reveals the Congress' intent. The original 
Senate version of § 7 (c) provided that "no sanction shall be 
imposed ... except as supported by relevant, reliable, and pro-
bative evidence." S. 7, 7gth Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). After 
the Senate passed this version, the House passed· the li:tnguage 
of the statute as it reads today, and the Senate accepted the 
amendment. Any doubt as to the intent of Congress is re-
moved by the House Report, which expressly adopted a pre-
ponderance of the evidence standard: 
"[W]here a party having the burden of proceeding has 
eome forward with a prima facie and substantial case, he 
will prevail unless his evidence is discredited or rebutted. 
20 It is true that the phrase "substantial evidence" is often used to 
denote the seope of judicial review. See n. 12, supra. But to conclude 
that the phrase "substantial evidence" in § 7 (c) define~ the :scope of 
judicial review would make the "sub::;tant.ial evidence" language of § 10 (e) 
redundant. Moreover, it is implausible to think that the draftcr:s of the 
APA would place a. scope of review standard iu the middle of tt st.atutory 
provision de:signed to govern evidentiary issuei:i in adjudicatory proceedings. 
Section 7 is entitled "Hearings ; pre:,iding employees; powers and duties; 
burden of proof ; evidence; record as basis of decision." It. "is made up 
almost entirely of a specifieation of the various clemt>nt~> of trial proce-
dure." 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law TreatisE' § 10:07, at 332 (1979) . 
More specifically, § 7 (c) allocates the burden of proof (placing it on the 
proponent of a rule or order), provides for a broad rule governing admissi-
bility of evidence, directs a.n agency to exclude "irrelevant., immaterial, or 
unduly repetitious evidence," and delineates the cvidentia.ry basis on which 
a "sanction ... may be imposed." 
Petitioner's argument overlooks the different. functions of initial decision-
making and judicia.! review of it. See Charlton v. Federal 'l'rade Commis-
sion, 177 U. S. App. D . C. 418, 422, 543 F. 2d 903 , 907 (1!}76); see gen-
erally 4 K. Davis, Administrat ive Law Treatise §§ 29.01-29.11 (1958) . Af:, 
we recognized in Consolo v. Fedel'al M!Lritime Commission, 383 U. S. 007 
10 
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In any case the agency must decide 'in accordance with 
the evidence.' Where there is evidence pro and con, the 
agency must weigh it and decide in accordance with the 
preponderance. In short, these provisions require a con-
scientious and rational judgment on the whole record in 
accordance with the proofs adduced." H. R. Rep. No. 
1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1946) (emphasis added).21 
(1966), the reviewing court is not to weigh the evidence, which Consolo 
a~sumed had already be-en done. 
21 Representative Wa.lter of Pennsylvania, author of the House Report 
and a principal drafter of the legislation, speaking during the fioor debate 
on the day the bill was passed by the House, ;;;tated as to the rne<wing of 
the phrase "in accorda.nce with . . . subr:,1:antial evidence," that "the ac-
cepted standard!l of proof, as distingui~hed from the mere adrni~ibility of 
evidence, are to govern in administrative proceedings as they do in courts 
of law and equity." S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 065. This state-
ment suggests that the u~uai preponderance standard was contemplated. 
See Sea Island Broadcasting Corp. v. Federal Communications Commission, 
- U. S. App D. C. -, -, 627 F. 2d 240, "24a ("The U8e of the 
!preponderance of evidence' standa.rd is the traditional standard in 
civil and administrative proceedings. It is the one contemplated by the 
Al>A, 5 D. S. C. § 556 (d) .»), cert. denied,- U. S.- (1980); ·Collins 
Securities Corp. v. Securiites and Exchange Commission, 183 U. S. App. 
D. C. 301, 304, 562 F. 20 S20, 823 (1977) ("The traditional standard of 
proof in a civil or administrative proceeding is the preponderance stand-
ard . . . . "); J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d ed. 1940); cf. Woodby v. 
Immigra-tion and Naturalization Se1·vice, supra, 385 U.S., at '288 (CJai:k, 
J., di8!lenting). 
Moreover, during the floor debate, in t.he context of a discussion of 
§ 10 (e), it was noted that the !lubr:,1:antial evidence test became the scope 
of review Standard Oeca-use of lt desite to }uwe CO'Orts ·review a~ncy 
decisionmaking more care1'ully than ur1der the then-prevalent scintilla-of 
evidence te<>t. It is clear from the debate that Congress intended agency 
decisionma'King to be done accordirrg to the preponderance of the evidence: 
"Mr. Springer. . . . The gentleman from Iowa .. . has gone rather 
carefully over the provisions of the bill. I de;;ire to CiLII attention to only 
one . . . relating to the question of reviewable acts, the review of the 
proceedings by the judiciary, aud the ~cope of the review. Under the 
llresebt procedure, in many casel;i where there is any evidence, -even A 
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Nor is there any suggestion in the legislative history that a 
standard of proof higher than a preponderance of the evidence 
was ever contemplated, much less intended. Congress was 
primarily concerned with the elimination of agency decision-
making premised on evidence which was of poor quality-
irrelevant, immaterial, unreliable and nonprobative-and of 
insufficient quantity-less than a preponderance. See H. R. 
Rep. No. 1980, supra, at 36-37 and 45; S. Doc. No. 248, supra, 
at 320-322 and 376-378; n. 21, supra. 
The language and legislative history of § 7 (c) lead us to 
conclude, therefore, that § 7 (c) was intended to establish a 
standard of proof and that the standard adopted is the tradi-
tional preponderance of the evidence standard. 22 
I 
11cintilla of evidence, decisions have been rendered and predicated on that 
character of evidence before the hearing tribunal. 
"Mr. Hancock. Even though contrary to the preponderance of the 
evidence. 
"Mr. Springer. Yes, ... that has been done in IlliiJlY cases even 
though it is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence introduced a$ 
the hearing." S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 376. 
22 Petitioner's reliance on Woodby v. Immigration and Naturalization 
Sm·vice, supra, is misplaced. There the Court required the Government 
to establish facts in deportation proceedings by cle~;~,r, unequivocal, and 
convincing evidence. The Court adopted this standard of proof because 
deportation proceedings were not subject to the AP A and the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act (INA) did not prescribe a standard of proof, 
only the scope of judicial review. 'I11e Court reached this conclusion after 
examining the language, legislative history, and purpose of § 106 (a) (4) 
and § 242 (b) ( 4) of the IN A. That both sections contained the words 
''reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence" has little bearing on the 
construction of somewhat different. language in an entirely different statute. 
The language, purpose, and legislative history of these seetions of the INA 
differ in material respects from the language, purpose, and legislative his-
tory of § 7 (c) . Section 106 (a) (4) wal:l explicitly labeled a judicial re-
view provision . Section 242 (b) ( 4) was abo eonstrued by the Court 
to be "addressed to reviewing courts," 385 U. S., at, 283, in pa1i. because 
at the time that thE' provision was adopted, there was no other scope of 
judicial review provision in the INA, id., at, 284. The APA by contrast 
was passed with an explicit judicial review provi...<;ion, § 10 (e), and with 
.. 
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III 
Our view of Congressional intent is buttressed by the Com .. 
mission's long standing practice of imposing sanctions accord-
ing to the preponderance of the evidence. As early as 1938, 
the Commission rejected the argument that in a proceeding 
to determine whether to suspend, expel or otherwise sanction 
a brokerage firm and its principals for, inter alia, manipula-
tion of security prices in violation of § 9 of the Securities Ex-
change Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78i, a standard of proof greater 
than the preponderance of the evidence standard was re-
quired. In re White, 3 S. E. C. 466, 539-540 (1938). Use of 
the preponderance standard continued after passage of the 
APA, and persists today. E. g., In re Cea, 44 S. E. C. 8, 25 
(1969); In re Pollisky, 43 S. E. C. 458, 459-460 (1967). The 
Commission's consistent practice, which is in harmony with 
§ 7 (c) and its legislative history, is persuasive authority that 
Congress intended that Commission disciplinary proceedings, 
a provision explicitly governing evidentiary matters before the agency, 
§ 7 (c). To the extent § 242 (b) ( 4) was viewed by the Court as represent-
ing a "yardtStick for the administrative fact.findcr," the Court concluded 
that the provision was directed at the quality of evidence upon which an 
order could bP based. !d., at 283. The language of §242 (b)(4) differs 
from the language of § 7 (c), which includes the additional phrase "in 
accordance with." Moreover, as explained above, the legislative history 
and purpose of § 7 (c) make clear t,hat it was not limited to quality of 
evidence concerns or directed at aU at judicial review. 
We thus accept Justice Clark's statement in dissent, with which the 
Court in Woodby did not disagrPe, that §§ 7 (c) and 10 (e) of the APA 
have "traditionally been held satisned when the agency decides on the 
preponderance of the evidence." !d., at 289, n. 1. (Clark, J., di~"Senting). 
Justice Clark's understanding of § 7 (c), as expressed in Woodby, is en-
titled to particular respect. We have previously noted that the Attorney 
General's Manual on t.he Administrative Procedure Act (1947) (Manual) 
has been "given t>ome deference by this Court. because of the role played 
by the Department of .Tu;,tice in drafting the legislation," Vennont Yankee 
Nuclear Powe1· Cm·p . v. Natuml Resou1·ces Defense Council, Inc., 435 
U. S. 519, 546 (1978), and Jm;tice Clark was Attorney General both when 
the AP A was pa~s!:'d and when the Manual was publish~. 
' . 
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subject to § 7 of the AP A, be governed by a preponderance of 
the evidence standard. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U. S. 
347, 358 ( 1979); United States v. National Association of Se-
curities Dealers, Inc., 422 U. S. 694, 719 (1975); Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944). 
In Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 1:35 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (foot-
note omitted), we stated that § 4 of the APA, 4 U. S. C. § 553, 
established the "maximum procedural requirements which 
Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies 
in conducting rulemaking procedures." In § 7 (c), Congress 
has similarly expressed its intent that adjudicatory proceed-
ings subject to the APA satisfy the statute where determina-
tions are made according to the preponderance of the evi-
dence. Congress was free to make that choice, Vance v. Ter-
razas, supra, 444 U. S., at 265-266, and, in the absence of 
countervailing constitutional considerations, the courts are not 
free ·'to disturb it. 
Affirmed. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.hprtmt arcurt qf tlft~b .§tattg 
Jlu Jringhm. ~. <!}. 2ll~J!. .;l 
February 3, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1266, Steadman v. SEC 
Dear Lewis, 
I suggest that we ask Bill Brennan to append 
the following at the foot of his opinion for the 
Court in this case: 
Justice Stewart and Justice Powell dissent. 
They believe it was incumbent upon the Com-
mission to prove violations of the antifraud 
provisions of the securities laws by clear and 
convincing evidence. The reasons for their 
view are substantially those stated by the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
in Whitney v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
196 U.S. App. D.C. 12, 604 F.2d 676 (1979) and 
Collins Securities Corp. v. Securities and Ex-
chan e Commission, 183 U.S. App. D.C. 301, 
562 F.2d 820 1977). 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: February 3, 1981 
RE: 79-1266, Steadman v. SEC 
I am reluctant to interfere with Justice 
Stewart's expeditious method of handling the dissent in this 
case. Nevertheless, my re-reading of Whitney and Collins 
suggests to me that his proposal does not do justice to the 
best line of reasoning that can be marshaled for the 
dissenting view. 
The problem with Whitney and Collins is that 
they treat the standard of proof as something that courts 
can virtually pluck out of the air. To be sure, each 
opinion does make the fraud analogy that I proposed in my 
memo earlier today. But neither opinion really ties the 
"clear and convincing" standard to anything in a statute. 
Justice Brennan's Court opinion holds that Congress in the 
APA sought to apply the preponderance test. Nothing in ...... 
Whitney or Collins addresses this argument. 
It seems to me that it is necessary to 
explain that Congress, at the time it enacted the Securities 
Acts, intended the clear and convincing standard to apply. 
It therefore would follow that the subsequent, general APA 
provision is inapplicable to this sort of case. 
As I suggested in my prior memo, there are 
problems even with this argument. But reliance on Whitney 






MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: February 3, 1981 
RE: 79-1266, Steadman v. SEC 
Here is WJB's proposed Court opinion in 
Steadman. At Conference, you and Justice Stewart were ~ 
to reverse. / J,..l ~ 
I think WJB's opinion is good. You~
Conference notes indicate that your vote was tentative~,. 
you may want to consider joining. (The opinion at 6 n.l5 
does note that petr advanced no consti tutionarl claim. 
~ .Petr's failure to do so always troubled you.) 
.~ ~Jr If, instead, you wish to dissent, the 
~~nt could go as follows: 
q(~ / ~ 1. The Court is correct that, absent 
I ~ ~rtstitutional difficulties, Congress has the power to set 
~ r· the burden of proof. 
2. But the APA provision is ~nly a general 
statement of the appropriate proof burden in administrative 
proceedings. 
3. Congress in particular statutes may have 
wished to set different proof burdens for proceedings held 
pursuant to those different statutes. 
4. The common law proof burden for fraud is 
"clear and convincing evidence." 
5. The SEC sanctions in this case are for 
acts very much akin to fraud. When Congress passed the 
Securities Acts in the 1930's (before the APA), it should be 
2. 
deemed to have incorporated the common law proof burden for 
fraud. 
6. Thus, the APA provision enacted 
subsequently does not override Congress' intention in the 
Investment Company Act. 
My recommendation is to join WJB. The 
weakness of the argument described above lies in steps ## 5-
6. WJB points out on pp. 12-13 that there seems to have 
been a long and consistent administrative construction of 
the Securities Acts as requiring only proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence. This administrative 
construction antedated the APA. Thus, we should presume 
that Congress was aware of and acquiesed in the SEC's 
construction of the Act. 
If you choose to dissent, I'll be happy to 
try my hand at one if the assignment comes our way. 
P.w.c. 2/3/81 
.:§nvrttttt <.!Jttltrtllf tqt ~tlt .;§taft .a 
11'JagJrin~n.lfl. <!f. 2lJ~JI,·~ · 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
February 3, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1266 - Steadman v. Securities and 
Exchange Commission 
Dear Bill: 




cc: The Conference 
.._. 
.§u:prtmt Qjoud !lf tlTt ~nift~ .§taftg 
.asfrtnghm.1fl. (1}. 2rl,SJ.l.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
February 4, 1981 
Re: No. 79-1266 Steadman v. SEC 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, ~/ .· v~ 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: February 6, 1981 
RE: 79-1266, Steadman v. SEC 
You wondered whether it would be possible to 
write a two- or three-page dissent in this case sketching 
out our grounds for disagreement with the majority. I 
quickly drafted a short one, and it is attached. It is 
obviously rough, but I give it to you in this form now so 
that you can decide whether it's worth pursuing. 
You also asked to see the case file. It, 




JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
~u.p-ttnt.t <!Jourt of t~e 'J!futi1'~ ~tnt.cs 
'Jl'Jasirhtgton.'!B. <!J. 2Dc?J!~ 
February 6, 1981 
Re: 79-1266 - Steadman v. SEC 
Dear Bill, 
I agree . 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
lfp/ss 2/6/81 
79-1266 Steadman v. SEC 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
In this case, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), acting under the anti-fraud provisions 5 
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, has imposed severe sanctions on 
petitioner. He has been barred permanently from 
practicing his profession of "investment adviser" and also 
forced to divest himself of an investment at substantial 10 
loss. In making its findings of fraud and imposing these 
penalties, the SEC applied the "preponderance of the 
evidence" standard of proof - the standard applicable in 
civil litigation. 
The Court today sustains the action of the SEC, 15 
holding that §7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), 5 u.s.c. §556(d), is applicable, and commands the 
use of this standard in disciplinary proceedings brought 
under the securities laws. The Court recognizes, however, 
(see ante, at 4-5), that the general provisions of the APA 20 




different procedure be used in the administration of a 
specific statute. Thus, the critical question is what was 
intended by Congress. The Administrative Procedure Act 
did not become law until some seven years following the 25 
enactment of the two statutes under which the SEC imposed 
these penalties. The Court points to no specific evidence 
of legislative intent that bears on the question at issue. 
We are considering here provisions of the 1940 Acts that 
authorize - as this case illustrates severe penalties for 30 
fraud. At common law, it was plain that allegations of 
fraud had to be proved by clear and convincing evidence 
[cite cases]. Absent any evidence to the contrary, it is 
reasonable to assume that Congress had no intention to 
adopt a lower standard of proof than the traditional 35 
common law burden. This view has been adopted by the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, see 
Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676 (1979); Collins Securities 
Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820 (1977), and the reasoning of 
its decisions is persuasive. 40 
Fairness and common sense dictate a similar 
conclusion. The petitioner in this case has practiced the 
3. 
profession of investment adviser for many years. In 
effect he has been disbarred from ever resuming that 
profession. Many penalties imposed under our criminal 
~ 
laws (e.g. , monetary fines or probation) are far less 
severe, and yet can be imposed only under the "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard of the criminal law. 
not imply any judgment as to whether the 
petitioner as alleged by the SEC in 
if adequately proved - the penalty 








to abandon the common law standard where fraud is charged, 
/ 
and also because notions of fairness that have been 
45 
50 
central to our law seem to require a clear and convincing 55 
evidence standard. 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
f ti i a the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), acting under the ant';(fraud provisions 5 
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment 
l~J . 
1940, ~[imposed severe sanctions on Advisers Act of 
petitioner. He has been barred permanently from 
and also 
forced to divest himself of an investment at substantial 10 
loss. In making its findings of fraud and imposing these 
penalties, the SEC applied the "preponderance of the 
evidence" standard of proob ~a 
The Court today sustains the action of the SEC, 15 
~ 
holding that t (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), 5 U.S.C. §556(d), is IPPl'rt I '*• saj commands the 
use of this standard in disciplinary proceedings brought 
under the securities laws. The Court recognizes, however, 
~ ante, at 4-~ that the general provisions of the APA 20 
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~lntended by Congress. t( The Administrat.ive Procedure Act 
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profession of investment adviser for many years. .c::@i' 
~cih 
~ 
he has been ~~barred from e ea• resuming that . -
profession. Many penalties imposed under our criminal 45 
laws (e.g., monetary fines or probation) are far less -
severe, and yet can be imposed only under the "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard of the criminal law. One need 
not imply any judgment as to whether the conduct of 
petitioner_, as alleged by the SEC in this case_, justified~O 
only because there is no evidence that Congress intended 
t ote~4 -4._~~~ ,~~ 
to abandon the common law standard wR:ere-~frau~ iil ettR&I!'!J&li, 
and also 
2. 
for In l l' this 
Commission 
case, the 
section 9 (b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 , 15 
U.S.C. § 80a-9 (b), and section 20 3 (f ) o f the Investment 
Advisers Act of 1940, 15 u.s.c. § 80b-3 (f). Sanctions 25 
~ fo·-~~· • ..( ·:ez ...... e...c.,J.._ """ 
imposed under these sect ions are 1\ ak iA t<> pe al ties for 
fraud. At common law, it was plain that allegations of 
fraud had to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
sJe::r 
[Cites.] Congress enacted t.he IRves'ement emupan1' and 
In.vestment against this common-law 
background. Because Congress in these acts did not 
specifically demonstrate its intention to override the 
~ ~ 1\,U..L~~ io ~ 
common-law proof burden, in construing the acts \i8 sl al i 
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tO apply. ~~Wh1 tney v. SEC, 196 U.S. App. D.C. 12, 604 
F.2d 676 (1979); Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC, 183 
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the Inveatrnent Company 
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b~ens &MUl tu=aaslogEms !!Mit ta at--somnu Lil 1,... Thus, the 
APA--a general statute applicable only where a specific 
statute is not--has no bearing on the proof burden in this 
case. 45 
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CHA~BERS OF 
..JUSTICE ..JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
February 9, 1981 
Re: 79-1266 - Steadman v. SEC 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Justice Brennan 




lfp/ss 2/11/81 Rider A, p. 3 (Steadman} 
There is no evidence that Congress intended, when it adopted 
these Acts, to authorize the SEC to abandon the the~ 
applicable standard of proof in adjudicating an issue of 
fraud. See Whitney v. SEC, 196 U.S. App. D.C. 12, 604 F.2d 
676 (1979}; Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC, 183 u.s. App. 
D.C. 201, 562 F.2d 820 (1977}. 
The Administrative Procedure Act, upon which the 
Court relies, did not become law until some seven years 
' 
after the enactment of the two statutes under which the SEC 
imposed these penalties. Again, the Court points to no 
specific evidence that Congress intended the APA to supplant 
J.r.-.A£,AA.1 ·rl-do-<~/ 
the common law ( rule0~aae . , ~er .... ~k-e····r:e:trs:ona e~ed--:-:!lJxnze,.....r 
m ~ ... +tave--~~a.pp 1 i aa&le i·n-£>-r,l!"U'&·~..s, ... ..Q.t;,g,w~,t. ... ~e-F·"...ehe 
--~~/ 
~ Thus, the APA - ( .general statute applicable 
only where a specific statute is not - should have no 
bearing on the standard of proof in this case~! imply no 
2. 
opinion as to petitioners guilt or innocence of the fraud 
charged. It is clear, however, that the SEC's finding of 
J.. f/ltJA, 
fraud 'C~ imposition of 
~ 
greater severity than penalties of 
lioften ~ imposed under the criminal 
J..-~ . (~ 
laws, resul~ in serious 
1 
stigma and deprivation. In the absence of evidence of any 
~ongressional intention to authorize the SEC to apply a 
..:,. 
lower standard of proof than the prevailing common law 
~ ~ 4/T lAY~ 44;1~~.) 
standardAapplicable ~ allega~on~ of £~atirl, we should not 
assume it. With all respect, it seems to me that the 
Court's decision today reflects an absence of the 
sensitivity that traditionally has marked our review of 
t . . . 't' f~t' d governmen 1mpos1t1on upon c1 1zens o •er1ouc s 1gma an 
II , • •• ~v.(. 
.r '\penalties. 
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5 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
acting under the antifraud provisions of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 10 
1940, has imposed severe sanctions on petitioner. He has 
been barred permanently from practicing his profession and 
also forced to divest himself of an investment at a 
substantial loss. In making its findings of fraud and 
imposing these penalties, the SEC applied the 15 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof. 
The Court today sustains the action of the SEC, 
holding that § 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), 5 u.s.c. §556(d), commands the use of this standard 
in disciplinary proceedings brought under the securities 20 
laws. The Court recognizes, however, ante, at 4-5, that 
2. 
the general provisions of the APA are applicable only when 
Congress has not intended that a different procedure be 
used in the administration of a specific statute. The 
critical inquiry thus is the identification of the 25 
standard of proof desired by Congress. 
The SEC acted in this case under section 9{b) of 
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 u.s.c. § 80a-9{b), 
and section 203{f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
15 u.s.c. § 80b-3 {f). Sanctions imposed under these 
sections are the functional equivalents of penalties for 
fraud. At common law, it was plain that allegations of 
fraud had to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 {1979); Woodby v. 
INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285, n. 18 {1966); Weininger v. 
Metropolitan Fire Insurance Co., 359 Ill. 584, 598, 195 
N.E. 420, 426 {1935); Bank of Pocahontas v. Ferimer, 161 
Va. 37, 41, 170 S.E. 591, 592 {1933); Bowe v. Gage, 127 
Wis. 245, 251, 106 N.W. 1074, 1076 {1906) .1 Congress 
1 Petitioner has practiced the profess ion of investment 
adviser for many years. He has been forever barred from 
resuming that profession. Many penalties imposed under 
our criminal laws--such as monetary fines and probation--




enacted the Investment Company and 40 
~cts against this common-law background. 
64- .~~-
in these acts did 
i.a.-t,e..~ • ..(. J ~ •..:t 
demonstrate its 
a.J,~~ .... ~ ~!t.J. hJ ~ ~ ~E(! 
intention to override the common-law proof burden, in 
-hr ~~ H~a4t'wl ~~;_.-44 ·~~ 
construing the acts it is reasonable to assume that 
Congress wanted to incorporate that proof burden. /see 45 
Whitney v. SEC, 196 U.S. App. D.C. 12, 604 F.2d 676 
(1979) ~ Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC, 183 u.s. App. 
D.C. 301, 562 F.2d 820 (1977) ·~ 
The Administrative Procedure Act did not become 
~-law until some seven years ( felllui:Rg the enactment of the 50 
I 
two statutes under which the SEC imposed these penalties. 
The Court points to no specific evidence that Congress 
/i ntended the APA to override the common-law rule 
incorporated in the 1940 statutes. Thus, the APA--a 
general statute applicable only where a specific statute 55 
is not--has no bearing on the proof burden in this case. 
I ~imply,.t~t: ~~~e~t~~ 
b1 ~~. 
a~ alleged by the SEC in this case, does not justify the 
under the "reasonable doubt" standard of the criminal law. 
4. 
penalty imposed. I dissent only because the stigma and 
deprivation penalties sought here, cf. 60 
Addington v. Texas, 418 (lif79) , suggest that 
Congress intended to the common-law standard 
of proof applicable to frau allegations of this sort. , 
,r 
There is no evideno( that Congr in enacting the APA, 
/ 
sought to 13bandon the common-law standard of proof 65 
to such allegations. 
... 
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JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
acting under the antifraud provisions of the Investment 5 
Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940, has imposed severe sanctions on petitioner. He has 
been barred permanently from practicing his profession and 
also forced to divest himself of an investment at a 
substantial loss. In making its findings of fraud and 10 
imposing these penalties, the SEC applied the 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof. 
The Court today sustains the action of the SEC, 
holding that § 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), 5 u.s.c. §556(d), commands the use of this standard 15 
in disciplinary proceedings brought under the securities 
laws. The Court recognizes, however, ante, at 4-5, that 
the general provisions of the APA are applicable only when 
Congress has not intended that a different procedure be 
used in the administration of a specific statute. 11 em.,....._ 20 
2. 
~ 
~e critical inqui~J is 1the identification of the standard 
- ~\ 
of proof · z 1 J by Congress. 
In this case, the SEC imposed severe sanctions 
on petitioner, il~i•J under section 9(b) of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, 15 u.s.c. § 80a-9 (b), and section 25 
203(f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 u.s.c. § 
80b-3(f). Sanctions imposed under these sections are the 
, 
functional equivalents of penalties for fraud. At common 
law, it was plain that allegations of fraud had to be 
~ 
proved by clear and convincing evidence. CITES. Congress 30 
enacted the Investment Company and Investment Advisers 
acts against this common-law background. Because Congress 
in these acts did not specifically demonstrate its 
intention to override the common-law proof burden, in 
construing the acts it is reasonable to assume that 35 
w.clf'" t ' ~+ ~::/ 
Congress iatc1168(] ±he- cW~r proof burdextts::: apply. 
~ l:l 
This view has been accepted by the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit, and the reasoning of its 
decisions is persuasive. Whitney v. SEC, 196 U.S. App. 
D.C. 12, 604 F.2d 676 (1979); Collins Securities Corp. v. 40 
SEC, 183 U.S. App. D.C. 301, 562 F.2d 820 (1977). 
3. 
The Administrative Procedure Act did not become 
law until some seven years following the enactment of the 
two statutes under which the SEC imposed these penalties. 
The Court points to no specific evidence that Congress 45 
intended the APA to override the common-law rule 
incorporated in the 1940 statutes. Thus, the APA--a 
general statute applicable only where a specific statute 
is not--has no bearing on the proof burden in this case. 
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5 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
acting under the antifraud provisions of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 10 
1940, has imposed severe sanctions on petitioner. He has 
been barred permanently from practicing his profession and 
also forced to divest himself of an investment at a 
substantial loss. In making its findings of fraud and 
imposing these penalties, the SEC applied the 15 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof. 
The Court today sustains the action of the SEC, 
holding that § 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), 5 u.s.c. §556(d), commands the use of this standard 
in disciplinary proceedings brought under the securities 20 
laws. The Court recognizes, however, ante, at 4-5, that 
2. 
the general provisions of the APA are applicable only when 
Congress has not intended that a different procedure be 
used in the administration of a specific statute. The 
critical inquiry thus is the identification of the 25 
standard of proof desired by Congress. 
The SEC acted in this case under section 9(b) of 
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 u.s.c. § 80a-9(b), 
and section 203(f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
15 u.s.c. § 80b-3 (f). Sanctions imposed under these 
sections are the functional equivalents of penalties for 
fraud. At common law, it was plain that allegations of 
fraud had to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
Addington v. Texas, 441 u.s. 418, 424 (1979): Woodby v. 
INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285, n. 18 (1966): Weininger v. 
Metropolitan Fire Insurance Co., 359 Ill. 584, 598, 195 
N.E. 420, 426 (1935): Bank of Pocahontas v. Ferimer, 161 
Va. 37, 41, 170 S.E. 591, 592 (1933): Bowe v. Gage, 127 
Wis. 245, 251, 106 N.W. 1074, 1076 (1906) .1 Congress 
1 Petitioner has practiced the profession of investment 
adviser for many years. He has been forever barred from 
resuming that profession. Many penalties imposed under 
our criminal laws--such as monetary fines and probation--




enacted the Investment Company and Investment Advisers 40 
acts against this common-law background. There is no 
evidence that Congress, when it adopted these Acts, 
intended to authorize the SEC to abandon the then-
applicable standard of proof in fraud adjudications. See 
Whitney v. SEC, 196 U.S. App. D.C. 12, 604 F.2d 676 45 
(1979) ~ Collins Secur~ties Corp. v. SEC, 183 U.S. App. 
D.C. 301, 562 F.2d 820 (1977). 
The Administrative Procedure Act, upon which the 
Court relies, did not become law for some seven years 
after the enactment of the two statutes under which the 50 
SEC imposed these penalties. Again, the Court points to 
no specific evidence that Congress intended the APA to 
supplant the burden of proof ru~Ra~~ 
securities laws. Thus, the APA--the general statute 
1 
applicable only where a specific statute is not--should 55 
have no bearing on the proof burden in this case. 
I 
tJ7,f., f1,...,_ ~nA-
imply no opinion abetrt: ~hether- the evidence 
1\. 
supports the SEC's allegations against petitioner. It is 
under the "reasonable doubt" standard of the criminal law. 
4. 
clear, however, that the SEC's finding of fraud and its 
imposition of harsh penalties have resulted in serious 60 
stigma and deprivation. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 u.s. 
418 (1979}. In the absence of any specific demonstration 
of Congress' purpose, we should not lightly assume that 
Congress intended the SEC to apply a lower standard of 
proof than the prevailing common law standard for similar 65 
allegations. With all respect, it seems to me that the 
Court's decision today reflects an absence of the 
sensitivity that traditionally has marked our review of 
the government's imposition upon citizens of severe 
penalties and permanent stigma. 70 
pwc 02/11/81 
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5 
JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
acting under the antifraud provisions of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 10 
1940, has imposed severe sanctions on petitioner. He has 
been barred permanently from practicing his profession and 
also forced to divest himself of an investment at a 
substantial loss. In making its findings of fraud and 
imposing these penalties, the SEC applied the 15 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof. 
The Court today sustains the action of the SEC, 
holding that § 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), 5 u.s.c. §556(d), commands the use of this standard 
in disciplinary proceedings brought under the securities 20 
laws. The Court recognizes, however, ~, at 4-5, that 
2. 
the general provisions of the APA are applicable only when 
Congress has not intended that a different procedure be 
used in the administration of a specific statute. The 
critical inquiry thus is the . identification of the 25 
standard of proof desired by Congress. 
~ ~ -t)_..; CAA (t 
~ft I • I a eet8e 1 ,!;.he SEC~ impoee9 severo BaRet: ioAs 
8A petitioRar under section 9(b) of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940, 15 u.s.c. § 80a-9{b), and section 203(f) of 
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 u.s.c. § 80b-3(f). 30 
Sanctions imposed under these sections are the functional 
equivalents of penalties for fraud. At common law, it was 
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plain that allegations of fraud had to be proved by clear 
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1"\. 
and convincing evidence. CITES .1 Congress enacted the 
Investment Company and Investment Advisers acts against , 35 
this common-law background. Because Congress in these 
acts did not specifically demonstrate its intention to 
override the common-law proof burden, in construing the 
\... ~ t;..J 
acts it is reasonable to assume that Congress(inco r poratel' 
that proof burden. "!'his r:ieu 'Aao beg A agcepted h!t'r tbg 
.CO~~ @E ...Appgelil f.Qii .t.h.ii ~;W;;..W;.i,.et oii •GlehtMbia•-€"-:rcni t, iuttin 
<-t>Ae uo"""io"! a£ its dec u totm ts peo-aio~itne:i v. 
40 
3. 
SEC, 196 U.S. App. D.C. 12, 604 F.2d 676 (1979): Collins 
Securities Corp. v. SEC, 183 U.S. App. D.C. 301, 562 F.2d 
820 (1977). 45 
The Administrative Procedure Act did not become 
law until some seven years following the enactment of the 
two statutes under which the SEC imposed these penalties. 
The Court points to no specific evidence that Congress 
intended the APA to override the common-law rule 50 
incorporated in the 1940 statutes. Thus, the APA--a 
general statute applicable only where a specific statute 
is not--has no bearing on the proof burden in this case. 
I do not imply that the conduct of petitioner, 
as alleged by the SEC in this case, does not justify the 55 
penalty imposed. I dissent only because the stigma and 
deprivation associated with the penalties sought here, cf. 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) , suggest that 
Congress intended to incorporate the common-law standard 
of proof applicable to fraud allegations of this sort. 60 
There is no evidence that Congress, in enacting the APA, 
sought to abandon the common-law standard of proof 
applicable to such allegations. 
CHAMBERS Of' 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
~tr rtutt <qlltttt .o-f tltt ~ttittb ~tattg 
~~g!p:n.gton. ~. <q. 211.?'*~ 




Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
-
February 12, 1981 
79-1266 Steadman v. SEC 
Dear Potter: 
Here is the short dissent that I mentioned 
yesterday. 
I have a preference for something along these 
lines because the two CADC cases do not answer Bill 
Brennan's reliance on the APA. Also, it seems worthwhile to 
make the contrast between the care with which sanctions are 
imposed under the criminal law with an administrative 
sanction that in many respects is far more severe. To bar a 
middle aged professional investment adviser from pursuing 
his vocation for life, and at the same time stigmatize him 
with a judgment of fraud, is more serious than most criminal 
penalties. 
I must say, however, that "our" petitioner is not 
exactly the fellow who merits one's sympathy! 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
lfp/ss 
'(• 
LFP 02/ /81 
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No. 79-1266, Steadman v. SEC 
JUSTICE 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
acting under the antifraud provisions of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 
1940, has imposed severe sanctions on petitioner. He has 
been barred permanently from practicing his profession and 
also forced to divest himself of an investment at a 
substantial loss. In making its findings of frc;tud and 
imposing these penalties, the SEC applied the 
"preponderance of the evidence" standard of proof. 
The Court today sustains the action of the SEC, 
holding that § 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA), 5 u.s.c. §556(d), commands the use of this standard 
in disciplinary proceedings brought under the securities 
laws. The Court recognizes, however, ?nte, at 4-5, that 
the general provisions of the APA are applicable only when 
Congress has not intended that a different procedure be 
t ,· 
·. 
used in the administration of a specific statute. The 
critical inquiry thus is the identification of the 
standard of proof desired by Congress. 
The SEC acted in this case under &8e'e rJ 9 (b) of 
the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 u.s.c. § 80a-9(b), 
and ~e~i~ 203(f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 
15 u.s.c. § "80b-3 (f). Sanctions imposed under these 
sections are the functional equivalents of penalties for 
fraud. At common law, it was plain that allegations of 
fraud had to be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979); Woodby v. 
INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285, n. 18 (1966); Weininger v. 
Metropolitan Fire Insurance Co., 359 Ill. 584, s;a, l95 
N.E. 420, 426 (1935); Bank of Pocahontas v. Ferimer, 161 
Va. 37, 41, 170 S.E. 591, 592 (1933); Bowe v. Gage, 127 
Wis. 245, 251, 106 N.W. 1074, 1076 (1906) .~ Congress 
enacted the Investment Company and ) Investment Advisers 
//~~~ -
':1 Peti tione practiced the profession of investment 
adviser for many years. He has been forever barred from 
resuming t at profess ion. Many penalties imposed under 
our crimin 1 laws--such as monetary fines and probation--
are far le s severe, and yet these can be imposed only 
under the ~easonable doubt" standard of the criminal law. 
-/ 
acts against this common-law background. There is no 
evidence that Congress, when it adopted these Acts, 
intended to authorize the SEC to abandon the then-
applicable standard of proof in fraud adjudications. See 
Whitney v. SEC, 196 U.S. App. D.C. 12, 604 F.2d 676 
(1979) i Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC, 183 U.S. App. 
D.C. 301, 562 F.2d 820 (1977). 
The Administrative Procedure Act, upon which the 
Court relies, did not become law for some seven years 
after the enactment of the two statutes under which the 
SEC imposed these penalties. Again, the Court points to 
no specific evidence that Congress intended the APA to 
supplant the burden of proof rule generally appllcable 
when the securities laws were enacted. Thus, the APA--the 
general statute applicable only where a specific statute 
is not--should have no bearing on the proof burden in this 
case. 
I imply no opinion on the question whether the 
evidence supports the SEC's allegations against 
petitioner. It is clear, however, that the SEC's finding 
of fraud and its imposition of harsh penalties have 
resulted in serious stigma and deprivation. Cf. Addington 
v. Texas, 441 u.s. 418 (1979). In the absence of any 
specific demonstration of Congress' purpose, we should not 
lightly assume that Congress intended the SEC to apply a 
lower standard of proof than the prevailing common law 
standard for similar allegations. With all respect, it 
seems to me that the Court's decision today reflects an 
absence of the sensitivity that traditionally has marked 
our review of the government's imposition upon citizens of 
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JusTICE PowELL, with whom JusTICE STEWART joins, 
dissenting. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), acting 
under the antifraud provisions of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, has 
imposed severe sanctions on petitioner. He has been barred 
permanently from practicing his profession and also forced 
to divest himself of an investment at a substantial loss. In 
making its findings of fraud and imposing these penalties, 
the SEC applied the "preponderance of the evidence" stand-
ard of proof. 
The Court today sustains the action of the SEC, holding 
that § 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 
U. S. C. § 556 (d), commands the use of this standard in dis-
ciplinary proceedings brought under the securities laws. The 
Court recognizes, however, ante, at 4-5, that the general pro-
visions of the AP A are applicable only when Congress has 
not intended that a different procedure be used in the ad-
ministration of a specific statute. The critical inquiry thus 
is the identification of the standard of proof desired by 
Congress. 
The SEC acted in this case under § 9 (b) of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-9 (b), and 
§ 203 (f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 80b-3 (f). Sanctions imposed under these sections are the 
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functional equivalents of penalties for fraud. At commoJ?. 
law, it was plain that allegations of fraud had to be proved 
by clear and convincing evidence. Addington v. Texas, 441 
U. S. 418, 424 (1979); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285, n. 
18 (H.J66); Weminger v. Metropolitan Fire Insurance Co., 
;359 Ill. 584, 598, 195 :N. E. 420, 426 (1935); Bank of Poca-
hontas v. Ferimer, 161 Va. 37, 41, 170 S. E. 591, 592 (1933); 
Bowe v. Gage, 127 Wis. 245, 251, 106 N. W. 1074, 1076 
(1906).* Congress enacted the Investment Company and 
Investment Advisers Acts against this common-law back-
ground. There is no evidence that Congress, when it adopted 
these Acts, intended to authorize the SEC to abandon the 
then-applicable standard of proof in fraud adjudications. 
See Whitney v. SEC, 196 U. S. App. D. C. 12, 604, F. 2d 676 
(1979); Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC, 183 U.S. App. D. C. 
301, 562 F. 2d 820 (1977). 
The Administrative Procedure Act, upon which the Court 
relies, did not become law for some seven years after the 
enactment of the two statutes under which the SEC imposed 
these penalties. Again, the Court points to no specific evi-
dence that Congress intended the AP A to supplant the bur-
den of proof rule generally applicable when the securities 
laws were enacted. Thus, the APA-the general statute ap-
plicable only where a specific statute is not-should have no 
bearing on the proof burden in this case. 
I imply no opinion on the question whether the evidence 
supports the SEC's allegations against petitioner. It is clear, 
however, that the SEC's finding of fraud and its imposition 
of harsh penalties have resulted in serious stigma and de-
privation. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). 
*Petitioner has practiced the profession of investment adviser for many 
years. He has been forever barred from resuming that, profession. 
Many penalties imposed under our criminal laws-such as monetary 
fines and probation-are far less severe, and yet the;se can be imposed 
only under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of the criminal law. 
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In the absence of any specific demonstration of Congress' 
purpose, we should not lightly assume that Congress intended 
the SEC to apply a lower standard of proof than the pre-
vailing common law standard for similar allegations. With 
all respect, it seems to me that the Court's decision today 
reflects an absence of the sensitivity that traditionally has 
marked our review of the Government's imposition upon citi-
zens of severe penalties and permanent stigma. 
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JusTICE PowELL, dissenting. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), acting 
under the antifraud provisions of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, has 
imposed severe sanctions on petitioner. He has been barred 
permanently from practicing his profession and also forced 
to divest himself of an investment at a substantial loss. In 
making its findings of fraud and imposing these penalties, 
the SEC applied the "preponderance of the evidence" stand-
ard of proof. 
The Court today sustains the action of the SEC, holding 
that § 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 
U. S. C. § 556 (d), commands the use of this standard in dis-
ciplinary proceedings brought under the securities laws. The 
Court recognizes, however, ante, at 4-5, that the general pro-
visions of the AP A are applicable only when Congress has 
not intended that a different standard be used in the ad-
ministration of a specific statute. The critical inquiry thus 
is the identification of the standard of proof desired by 
Congress. 
The SEC acted in this case under § 9 (b) of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a- 9 (b), and 
§ 203 (f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 80b-3 (f). Sanctions imposed under these sections are the 
functional equivalent of penalties for fraud. At common law, 
------
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it was plain that allegatio11s of fraud had to be proved by 
clear and convincing evidence. E. g., Addington v. Texas, 441 
U. S. 418, 424 (1979); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285, n. 
18 (1966); Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Insurance Co., 
359 Ill. 584, 598, 195 N. E. 420, 426 (1935); Bank of Poca-
hontas v. Ferimer, 161 Va. 37,40-41, 170 S. E. 591,592 (1933); 
Bowe v. Gage, 127 Wis. 245, 251, 106 N. W. 1074, 1076 
( H)06). Congress enacted the Investment Company and 
Inv:estment Advisers Acts against this common-law back-
ground. There is no evidence that Congress, when it adopted 
these Acts, intended to authorize the SEC to abandon the 
then-applicable standard of proof in fraud adjudications. 
See Whitney v. SEC, 196 U. S. App. D. C. 12, 604 F. 2d 676 
(1979); Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC, 183 U.S. App. D. C. 
301. 562 F. 2d 820 (1977). 
The Administrative Procedure Act, upon which the Court 
relies, did not become law for some seven years after the 
enactment of the two statutes under which the SEC imposed 
these penalties. Again, the Court points to no specific evi-
dence that Congress intended the APA to supplant the bur-
den of proof rule generally applicable when the securities 
laws were enacted. Thus, the APA-the general statute ap-
plicable only where a specific statute is not--should have no 
bearing on the proof burden in this case. 
I imply no opinion on the question whether the evidence 
supports the SEC's allegations against petitioner. It is clear, 
however, that the SEC's ·finding of fraud and its imposition 
of harsh penalties have resulted in serious stigma and de-
privation. Cf. Addington v. Texas, supra.* In the absence 
of any specific demoustration of Congress' purpose, we should 
*Petitioner has practicE-d the profession of investment adviser for many 
years. He has been forever barred from re:;uming t.lw.t profe::::;ion. 
Many penaltie:; impo::;ed undE-r our erimimd h~w::;-::mch a.· monetary 
fines and probation-are far lr:;::; :;evere, a.nd yet the::;e caJl be imposed 
only under the "beyond a reasonu.ble doubt" stand:~rd of the criminal law. 
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not assume that Congress intended the SEC to apply a lower 
standard of proof than the prevailing common law standard 
for similar allegations. With all respect, it seems to me that 
the Court's decision today lacks the sensitivity that tradi-
tionally has marked our review of the Government's imposi-
~ tion upon citizens of severe penalties and permanent st~grna. 
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JusTICE PowELL, with whom JusTICE STEWART joins, 
dissenting. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), acting 
under the anti'fraud provisions of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, has 
imposed severe sanctions on petitioner. He has been barred 
permanently from practicing his profession and also forced 
to divest himself of an investment at a substantial loss. In 
making its findings of fraud and imposing these penalties, 
the SEC applied the "preponderance of the evidence" stand-
ard of proof. 
The Court today sustains the action of the SEC, holding 
that § 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 
U. S. C. § 556 (d) , commands the use of this standard in dis-
ciplinary proceedings brought under the securities laws. The 
Court recognizes, however, ante, at 4-5, that the general pro-
visions of the AP A are applicable only when Congress has 
not intended that a different standard be used in the ad~ 
ministration of a specific statute. The critical inquiry thus 
is the identification of the standard of proof desired by 
Congress. 
The SEC acted in this case under § 9 (b) of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-9 (b), and 
§ 203 (f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 80b- 3 (f) . Sanctions imposed under these sections are the 
functional equivalent of penalties for fraud. At common law,. 
) 
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it was plain that allegations of fraud had to be proved by 
clear and convincing evidence. E. g., Addington v. Texas, 441 
U. S. 418, 424 (1979); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285, n. 
18 (1966); Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Insurance Co., 
359 Ill. 584, 598, 195 N. E. 420, 426 (1935); Bank of Poca-
hontas v. Ferimer, 161 Va. 37,40--41, 170 S. E. 591,592 (1933); 
Bowe v. Gage, 127 Wis. 245, 251, 106 N. W. 1074, 1076 
( 1906). Congress enacted the Investment Company and 
Investment Advisers Acts against this common-law back-
ground. There is no evidence that Congress, when it adopted 
these Acts, intended to authorize the SEC to abandon the 
then-applicable standard of proof in fraud adjudications. 
See Whitney v. SEC, 196 U. S. App. D. C. 12, 604 F. 2d 676 
(1979); Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC, 183 U.S. App. D. C. 
301. 562 F. 2d 820 (1977). 
The Administrative Procedure Act, upon which the Court 
relies, did not become law for some seven years after the 
enactment of the two statutes under which the SEC imposed 
these penalties. Again, the Court points to no specific evi-
dence that Congress intended the APA to supplant the bur-
den of proof rule generally applicable when the securities 
laws were enacted. Thus, the APA-the general statute ap-
plicable only whf:'re a specific statute is not-should have no 
bearing on the proof burden in this case. 
I imply no opinion on the question whether the evidence 
supports the SEC's allegations against petitioner. It is clear, 
however, that the SEC's finding of fraud and its imposition 
of harsh penalties have resulted in serious stigma and de-
privation. Cf. Addington v. Texas, supra.* In the absence 
of any specific demonstration of Congress' purpose, we should 
*Petitioner has practiced the profes~ion of investment adviser for many 
years. He has been forever barred from resuming that profession. 
Many penalties impo~ed under our criminal laws-such as monetary 
tines and probation-are far lesl:l severe, and yet these can be imposed 
only under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of the criminallawr 
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not assume that Congress intended the SEC to apply a lower 
standard of proof than the prevailing common law standard 
for similar allegations. With all respect, it seems to me that 
the Court's decision today 1acks the sensitivity that tradi-
tionally has marked our review of the Government's imposi-
·tion ;upon citizens of severe penalties and permanent stigmll,, 
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JusTICE PowELL, with whom JusTICE STEWART joins, 
dissenting. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), acting 
under the antifraud provisions of the Investment Company 
Act of 1940 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, has 
imposed severe sanctions on petitioner. He has been barred 
permanently from practicing his profession and also forced 
to divest himself of an investment at a substantial loss. In 
making its findings of fraud and imposing these penalties, 
the SEC applied the "preponderance of the evidence" stand-
ard of proof. 
The Court today sustains the action of the SEC, holding 
that § 7 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 
U. S. C. § 556 (d) , commands the use of this standard in dis-
ciplinary proceedings brought under the securities laws. The 
Court recognizes, however, ante, at 4-5, that the general pro-
visions of the AP A are applicable only when Congress has 
not intended that a different standard be used in the ad-
ministration of a specific statute. The critical inquiry thus 
is the identification of the standard of proof desired by 
Congress. 
The SEC acted in this case under § 9 (b) of the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-9 (b), and 
§ 203 (f) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 80b- 3 (f) . Sanctions imposed under these sections are the 
functional equivalent of penalties for fraud. At common law,. 
/ 
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it was plai11 that allegations of fraud had to be proved by 
clear and convincing evidence. E. g., Addington v. Texas, 441 
U.S. 418, 424 (1979); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285, n. 
18 (1966) ; Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Insurance Co., 
359 Ill. 584, 598, 195 N. E. 420, 426 (1935); Bank of Poca-
hontas v. Ferim,er, 161 Va. 37, 40-41, 170 S. E. 591, 592 (1933); 
Bowe v. Gage, 127 Wis. 245, 251, 106 N. W. 1074, 1076 
( 1906). Congress enacted the Investment Company and 
Investment Advisers Acts against this common-law back-
ground. There is no evidence that Congress, when it adopted 
these Acts, intended to authorize the SEC to abandon the 
then-applicable standard of proof in fraud adjudications. 
See Whitney v. SEC, 196 U. S. App. D. C. 12, 604 F. 2d 676 
(1979); Collins Securities Corp. v. SEC, 183 U.S. App. D. C. 
301. 562 F. 2d 820 (1977) . 
The Administrative Procedure Act, upon which the Court 
relies, did not become law for some seven years after the 
enactment of the two statutes under which the SEC imposed 
these penalties. Again , the Court points to no specific evi-
dence that Congress intended the APA to supplant the bur-
den of proof rule generally applicable when the securities 
laws were enacted. Thus, the APA- the general statute ap-
plicable only wht>re a specific statute is not-should have no 
bearing on the proof burden in this case. 
I imply no opinion on the question whether the evidence 
supports the SEC's allegations against petitioner. It is clear, 
however, that the SEC's finding of fraud and its imposition 
of harsh penalties have resulted in serious stigma and de-
privation. Cf. Addington v. Texas, supra.* In the absence 
of any specific demonstration of Congress' purpose, we should 
*Petitioner has practiced the profession of investment adviser for many 
years. He has been forever barred from resuming tha.t profe:>sion. 
Many penalties impol:led under our criminal Jaws- l:ltlCh as monetary 
fines and probation-are far le~~ severe, and yet these can be imposed 
vnly under the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of the criminallawr 
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not assume that Congress intended the SEC to apply a lower 
standard of proof than the prevailing common law standard 
for similar allegations. With all respect, it seems to me that 
the Court's decision today 1acks the sensitivity that tradi-
tionally has marked our review of the Government's imposi-
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March 24, 1981 
No. 79-1266 Steadman v. s:oc 
A suggestion from the Office of the Solicitor General prompts 
rre to suggest that I change footnote 13 in my opinion in the al::ove 
case, which came dawn on February 25, 1981. The relevant language 
naw reads: 11 Substantial evidence review by the courts of appeals 
requires a hearing on the record .... Otherwise effective review 
by the courts of appeals would be frustrated. 11 I suggest a change 
to: 11 Substantial evidence review by the Court of Appeals here 
required a hearing on the record. . . . Otherwise effective review 
by the Court of Appeals would have been ·frustrated. 11 I will 
assume there is no objection unless I hear to the contrary. 
Sincerely, 
The Conference 
